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How to Distinguish Autonomy from Integrity

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*How to Distinguish Autonomy from Integrity*¹

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I

- 1) "'Be true to yourself!' and 'Don't cave in!' express the value people place on [_____]...."²
- 2) '... an important sense of [_____] is being true to oneself.'³
- 3) '[_____] encourages and protects people's general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to and for them.'⁴

1 I want to thank Colin MacLeod, David Reidy, Dennis Klimchuk, and two anonymous referees, who were very generous with their comments, which helped me to improve the paper a lot.

2 Diana Meyers, 'Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self?: Opposites Attract!' in *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self*, Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press 2000), 151

3 Victoria Davion, 'Integrity and Rational Change,' in *Feminist Ethics*, Claudia Card, ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 1991), 190

4 Ronald Dworkin, *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Vintage Books 1993), 224

- 4) '... to value [_____] is to place value on an agent's acting from *her* reasons, whether they are good ones or not.'⁵

Quiz: fill in the blanks. Here is a hint: two are autonomy and two are integrity. Can you sort out which ones are which? I suspect not, especially since the first two are nearly identical but have different answers. The third seems clearly to be integrity, at least given what philosophers such as Bernard Williams⁶ write about integrity: that it involves preserving one's own distinct character. However, the answer to 3) is autonomy. The fourth quotation brings to mind discussions about how autonomous agents can make bad choices, but we respect their autonomy by allowing them to do so. However, the answer to 4) is integrity.

These quotations are obviously out of context and within their appropriate contexts you would know the answers. Nevertheless, the exercise reveals significant overlap in the way that philosophers talk about autonomy and integrity. And since many do not explain how they interpret the difference between the two, the overlap is confusing.

Immediately, one might question whether eliminating the confusion is possible. Unlike integrity, autonomy is mostly a philosophical term of art, one that philosophers use in a myriad of ways: that is, to refer to demonstrating an ability to govern oneself, to acting rationally, to having certain rights, to choosing freely, et cetera. Since it is a term of art (none of us grow up with it surely, unless perhaps we are children of philosophers) we have no pre-theoretical intuitions with which to evaluate how philosophers use it, or so one might claim. But would one be right? I do not think so. 'Autonomy' represents a phenomenon with which people do have some experience and on which they could comment in a pre-theoretical way.⁷ The phenomenon is that of self-government or self-rule, as opposed to government or rule by others. When *we* govern our own actions and choices, we are autonomous; when someone else does so, we are not. We all have pre-theoretical intuitions about these phenomena; and we could use them to define autonomy and distinguish it from integrity, with the help of pre-theoretical intuitions about the latter as well.

5 Cheshire Calhoun, 'Standing for Something,' *Journal of Philosophy* 92 (1995), 248

6 'Integrity,' in *Utilitarianism: For and Against*, B. Williams and J.J.C. Smart (New York: Cambridge 1973); and 'Persons, Character and Morality,' in Williams's *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1981). Lynne McFall has this view of integrity as well. See her 'Integrity,' *Ethics* 98 (1987) 5-20.

7 Diana Meyers agrees and discusses the issue in 'Intersectional Identity,' 151.

Since my purpose here is to distinguish autonomy from integrity, not to defend an entire theory of autonomy, I have to take a certain view of it for granted. According to the dominant view in contemporary moral theory, to be autonomous is to exercise a psychological ability to govern oneself (or to 'be true to oneself'), and not necessarily to act rationally, to have certain rights, or even to choose freely. This view originates from the work of Harry Frankfurt. I take the literature surrounding his work as my starting point.

If autonomy involves governing oneself, one might wonder why confusion exists at all about how to distinguish it from integrity. One might say that while self-governance involves acting on one's desires even if they conflict with what is right, integrity involves avoiding temptation to do anything other than what is right; people with integrity have an uncorrupted character, which is untrue of people with autonomy. How then could autonomy and integrity *be* mistaken for one another? The answer lies both in the condition of authenticity that most ethicists attribute to integrity as well as to autonomy (and which all of the quotations above emphasize) and in a distinction they make between personal and moral integrity. People with autonomy do what they desire, which suggests that their desires must be authentic. To have autonomy is to be true to *one's* self, not to other selves. Philosophers writing on integrity say the same thing about it (leaving open the possibility that some people *with* corrupt characters have integrity). Further, they deny that integrity inevitably entails doing what one believes to be right as opposed to what one believes to be good for oneself, because people can have personal integrity but lack moral integrity. If all of that is true, how could one *not* mistake autonomy and integrity for one another?

There must be some way of distinguishing the two, one would think (just given that they *seem* different from one another). I agree. However, I aim to show that many of the ways in which one might try to distinguish them — extracting from what philosophers have written about autonomy and integrity⁸ — do not work. For example, integrity does not differ from autonomy on the grounds that it does not require critical self-reflection, but autonomy does.⁹ Nor does it differ because it involves

8 None has written anything comprehensive about how the two differ from one another.

9 Most philosophers writing on autonomy, especially Frankfurt, say that critical self-reflection is a key element of autonomy, while philosophers writing on integrity do not say the same thing about it. See Frankfurt's 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,' in his *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988).

adhering to our core values specifically, whereas autonomy involves adhering to all of our values as long as they are authentic.¹⁰ Values relevant to integrity are no more a part of our ‘core’ on my view than values relevant to autonomy.

I argue that integrity is different from a form of autonomy at least, but that integrity and autonomy do overlap considerably. Integrity itself is a form of autonomy: what ethicists call ‘moral autonomy.’ (They tend to distinguish not only between personal and moral integrity, but also between personal and moral autonomy.) Autonomy is the genus, one might say, with integrity (i.e., moral autonomy) and personal autonomy being species of it. People with integrity are self-governing in the domain of morality; they establish their own conception of what is right and act accordingly. The prototypical version of integrity is moral, although we do sometimes use the term in other (i.e., non-prototypical) ways.¹¹ While integrity is a form of autonomy, it differs from personal autonomy, which involves acting on one’s own view of what is good for one’s self, but not obviously good for others. I associate the right (interpreted subjectively) with integrity and the good (also subjective) with autonomy, except insofar as people interpret what is good for them as good for everyone. If they act on that sort of conception of the good, they act with integrity in my view. In such cases, the good and the right overlap with the good informing the right. (One assumes that what is right is to promote the objective good of others.)

The view of autonomy I endorse differs substantially from Immanuel Kant’s. While Kant saw autonomy as either a matter of doing what is good or what is right and argued for the latter, I claim that to the extent autonomy differs from integrity, it concerns the good (insofar as one applies it only to one’s own life; see above). Further, while Kant saw autonomy as an objective notion — the content of autonomous reflection

10 Many philosophers, including Williams and McFall, explicitly associate having integrity with acting on values that are ‘core,’ or central to one’s identity, but philosophers writing on autonomy in the Frankfurtian tradition do not do the same with it, not explicitly.

11 For a discussion of prototypes and how they structure moral concepts, see Mark Johnson’s *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993) along with *Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science*, Larry May, Marilyn Friedman, and Andy Clark, eds. (Cambridge: The MIT Press 1996). I refer throughout to a prototypical sense of integrity in Western culture. As with autonomy, I do not pretend to capture all of the ways in which we use ‘integrity,’ including non-prototypical ways (e.g., the ‘integrity’ of objects).

is determined objectively — here my conception is subjective,¹² as is my conception of integrity.

Autonomy and integrity are highly similar, which makes it especially important that we know how they differ. Distinguishing between concepts that overlap substantially (e.g. trust versus reliance, shame versus guilt) allows us to clarify what roles the two of them play, and also how to use the concepts. If autonomy, insofar as it differs from integrity, refers to doing what we perceive to be good for ourselves, which may not be good for everyone, then it involves carving out and preserving space for ourselves in a moral community¹³ — in other words, forming and sustaining a personal identity within it. Integrity, by contrast, entails offering forth our best judgment to members of our moral community about how we and they should live and be treated by others.¹⁴ It involves supporting a moral identity for that community, so to speak. Only insofar as we do that do we have integrity. I contend that both integrity and personal autonomy require that we reflect on what *we* believe and act accordingly, as opposed to acting on what others believe. However, the perspective of someone with integrity is social in an important respect that is lacking for someone with only personal autonomy.¹⁵

12 Here it is subjective, because I am taking as my starting point the dominant view of autonomy (i.e., Frankfurt's), according to which the content of *autonomous* reflection is subjective. Elsewhere, I defend a more controversial view, according to which some objective (or substantive) limits exist on the mental contents of autonomous agents. Among these limits are justified self-trust, and self-respect. See my *Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2002).

13 Autonomy can do the first task because it is not simply a condition but also a capacity. See Joel Feinberg's 'Autonomy,' in *The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy*, John Christman, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989). One's capacity for autonomy allows one to shape an identity for oneself, but one is not fully autonomous until one has an identity that informs one's choices (i.e., that makes them one's own).

14 See Calhoun, 'Standing for Something.'

15 The important respect has to do with the content of what a person with integrity stands for: it concerns how everyone should act, not just how the agent himself should act, which is the case for personal autonomy. I do not deny, and in fact argue in *Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy* that autonomy is a social phenomenon in the sense that it is exercised and developed only in certain kinds of social environments. See also Mackenzie's and Stoljar's *Relational Autonomy* volume (2000), and Stefaan Cuyper's *Self-Identity and Personal Autonomy* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2001), ch. 6. Integrity, I would argue, is similarly 'relational' (i.e., socially constituted).

II False Distinctions

If my way of distinguishing autonomy from integrity does not seem at all compelling, first consider what is wrong with other attempts. I shall investigate the following possibilities. 1) To have autonomy, one must engage in critical self-reflection, which is unnecessary for integrity.¹⁶ 2) What is necessary for integrity is that one acts on one's core values, those that define one's identity. By contrast, autonomy involves being true to all of our values.¹⁷ 3) Lastly, a willingness to resist challenges to one's own views is central to having integrity, but not autonomy.¹⁸ These distinctions are among the most plausible of all possible distinctions, given how philosophers have conceptualized integrity and autonomy (specifically in the latter case, within the literature on autonomy that I mentioned above). Let me elaborate on each and explain why each is problematic.

1. *The Need for Critical Self-Reflection*

The dominant view is that to be autonomous, one must critically reflect on one's desires to determine which desires are authentic, since autonomy involves acting on one's *own* desires. Does that view overlap with what philosophers say and with what we would agree is true about integrity? One might think not: self-reflection does not figure prominently in philosophical discussions about integrity; further, one could imagine a person who is not at all self-reflective having integrity. Consider someone who is socialized strongly in a certain religious tradition to hold her religious views uncritically, which she does. But she also stands for them passionately in the face of social ridicule, ostracism, and the like. Would we not say that such a person had integrity, and not only that, but profound integrity? I actually do not think that we would, since the person (being uncritical) must respond to social criticism in a dogmatic way. People must hold their views *critically* to have integrity because having it is incompatible with dogmatism, which we avoid

16 See note 9.

17 See note 10.

18 Philosophers who strongly associate resistance and struggle with integrity include Calhoun (see above), and Amelie Rorty. See the latter's 'Integrity: Political, not Psychological,' in *Integrity in the Public and Private Domain*, Alan Montefiore and David Vines, eds. (New York: Routledge 1999).

through critical self-reflection.¹⁹ Philosophers have either underestimated or ignored the value of self-reflection for integrity. Yet they have not *overestimated* its value for autonomy, or so I shall argue. Both autonomy and integrity require critical self-reflection. I add that since psychological integration is a product of such reflection, autonomy and integrity both involve psychological integration. Also, since no substantive restrictions exist on the products of self-reflection with both autonomy and integrity, neither of them is a virtue in its own right (although there is a sense in which integrity is more of a virtue — more specifically, a ‘master virtue’ — than autonomy *if my theory of how to distinguish the two is correct*).

First, let me point out that not all philosophers agree that self-reflection is necessary for autonomy. Some argue that it makes ‘the defined notion [i.e., “autonomy”] no longer appropriate to discussions of autonomy in moral, legal, medical, and everyday contexts.’²⁰ Why not? Well, no one would condone paternalism toward everyone who is not self-reflective, which for these philosophers, includes many, if not most people. ‘The defined notion’ as one that involves self-reflection only heightens rather than addresses our worries about when paternalism is appropriate.²¹ Moreover, nothing about autonomy demands self-reflection according to these theorists. Those who say otherwise (e.g., Frankfurt) assume that having *a self* that is self-governing involves being self-reflective in a way that generates authentic values.²² Yet is self-reflection really required for selfhood? The former theorists say ‘no.’ As one of them comments, ‘[we] can speak quite intelligibly about persons who are utterly lacking in critical self-reflection.... It seems patently absurd to claim that anyone living [an unexamined] life is not a person or that such a person lacks a self.’²³

19 For brevity’s sake, I will not always include the adjective ‘critical’ when referring to critical self-reflection. I claim that the kind of self-reflection both autonomy and integrity demand is critical in the sense that it establishes whether the agent’s values are truly her own. Such critical analysis can occur at different levels of intensity, as I suggest below.

20 Richard Double, ‘Two Types of Autonomy Accounts,’ *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 22 (1992), 70. See as well Robert Noggle’s ‘The Public Conception of Autonomy and Critical Self-Reflection,’ *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35 (1997) 495-515.

21 Double, ‘Two Types,’ 70

22 Frankfurt, ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’ in *The Importance of What We Care About*, 170 & 171.

23 Noggle, ‘The Public Conception of Autonomy,’ 506

But is that claim really absurd? I do not think so. One can legitimately wonder how a self could even arise without self-reflection. Through what mechanisms could one be moulded out of the 'raw materials of inner life' (as Frankfurt asks), if not through mechanisms that include self-reflection?²⁴ Socialization could not do the job alone, unless one's socialization was narrow and confined, exposing one to singular, unconflicting messages about how to be or what to believe. Self-reflection is crucial in the face of *mixed* social messages, which most of us experience all of the time (especially those of us who are oppressed²⁵). Thus if autonomy (i.e., *self-governance*) entails selfhood, it must include self-reflection, for selves exist in part because of self-reflection.²⁶

Note that the requirement I am suggesting for selfhood, and which Frankfurt and his followers suggest for autonomy, is not that people reflect 'extensively and well about themselves.'²⁷ People do not have to reflect well, but only such that they deal with inconsistencies in their lives that threaten their sense of self.²⁸ They do not have to reflect extensively, regardless of whether that means reflecting all of the time or reflecting on all or most of the 'materials' of their inner lives. Reflecting all of the time is unnecessary, as opposed to reflecting when the above inconsistencies arise. Further, people only have to reflect at any one time on *relevant* materials of their inner lives, that is, those that they need to revise or discard to keep themselves intact. They could not possibly reflect on their whole mental life at any one time anyway because they need something to reflect *with* (i.e., values with which to evaluate other values).²⁹

Faced with this account of autonomy and self-reflection, the worry about always having to be paternalistic should subside. People must already be somewhat self-reflective if they even have selves; hence, the

24 Frankfurt, 'Identification and Wholeheartedness,' 170

25 See Marilyn Frye's 'Oppression,' in *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory* (Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press 1983).

26 As Frankfurt puts it, one 'constitutes' oneself by reflecting upon and deciding what one wants (and presumably, the more one reflects and decides, the more one constitutes oneself): see 'Identification and Wholeheartedness,' 170 & 172.

27 Double assumes that reflection of this sort is necessary according to the dominant view of autonomy: see 'Two Types,' 70.

28 Frankfurt says as much in 'The Faintest Passion,' in his *Necessity, Volition, and Love* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), 99, 100, 106. He discusses the need to be self-reflective so that one can replace 'unsatisfying' (i.e., inconsistent or ambivalent) truths about oneself, and ultimately be a whole, autonomous self.

29 See Frankfurt's 'On the Necessity of Ideals,' in *Necessity, Volition*, 115.

need for paternalism (i.e., toward those who are unreflective) would not be extreme. Still, are most people reflective enough that their selves are truly their own, making them truly autonomous? If by 'truly autonomous,' one means fully autonomous, then the question is whether full autonomy is needed. Must we ensure in 'moral, legal, medical, and everyday contexts' that people are fully autonomous? The answer may depend on the context, and the decision being made within it. If the decision could have an enormous impact on the person's life, a high degree of autonomy may be necessary, or at least preferable. If the decision is of relatively minor importance, a low degree of autonomy may be sufficient. The point here is that autonomy admits of degrees³⁰ and the need for full autonomy is probably rare, or infrequent at best, and thus so is the need for the degree of self-reflection that goes along with it (which is not even reflection done well and extensively). Hence, constantly being paternalistic toward people who engage in relatively little self-reflection will not be necessary.³¹

If autonomy requires self-reflection because one would not have a self to govern otherwise, presumably, integrity requires it for a similar reason: without self-reflection, there would be no self that has integrity or not. Further reasons exist, however, for making self-reflection a requirement for integrity. One is that we want people with integrity to act on views that they *endorse*, rather than those with which they merely identify, in a descriptive sense rather than an evaluative sense (i.e., they are simply views with which one finds oneself³²). This point becomes obvious once we consider cases in which 'identification [descriptive sense] and endorsement part company.'³³ Imagine a gay man who endorses pride that he feels in being gay; however, his pride is not pure, for he also identifies with the view that his sexual desires are nasty. He

30 It is also a threshold concept: that is, only beyond a certain threshold could one be said to be autonomous, and different degrees of autonomy exist beyond that threshold. As I suggest above (see especially n. 26), the concept of self is similar.

31 Those who are worried that unreflective people would face such treatment also seem to have a narrow view of paternalism. They refer to unreflective people being coerced or marginalized. However, paternalism does not have to involve such acts. Trying to persuade someone of one's point of view is a form of paternalism, one that we often engage in when people appear to us to be flippant about important life decisions. That my view of autonomy sanctions paternalism in circumstances in which people have reflected little and the decision they face is important does not make that view counter-intuitive.

32 See Christman's introduction to *The Inner Citadel*, 8.

33 Calhoun, 'Standing for Something,' 243

has fairly deep psychological impulses to conform to the dominant norms of his community, which are homophobic. He certainly does not endorse the view that his desires are nasty; he would not call that view his own, although he admits to identifying with it. Identification of that sort cannot be sufficient for integrity. People with integrity stand for what they *endorse*, which is something they discover only through self-reflection.³⁴

Why is endorsement necessary for integrity? The answer is, endorsement suggests that one has reasons for it, and it is important that people with integrity have reasons to support their opinions, especially controversial ones. Otherwise, they will be dogmatic, which would interfere with them having integrity in at least one of two ways. First, people who are dogmatic in response to legitimate reasons to revise their opinions often lack the psychological integration that is needed for integrity.³⁵ Integrity is linked etymologically with integration. People who have integrity are integrated such that they feel the kind of serenity that goes along with knowing that their beliefs are coherent. Dogmatic people lack such integration, unless they are completely irrational; other people criticize them in perfectly legitimate ways, and rather than deal with the criticism, they dismiss it for no reason. Such a response must fragment their selves, unless, again, their selves are entirely irrational. It must lower their confidence as to whether their beliefs *are* in fact coherent.

Second, dogmatic people cannot fulfill an important social role that people with integrity play — that is, of offering forth their best judgment to others about what is worth doing in society, which helps to promote a fruitful exchange of ideas on such issues. This task is important for people with integrity insofar as integrity has social value, and not only personal value (i.e., for keeping people integrated). I discuss this view of integrity below.³⁶ If integrity has the purpose to which the view ascribes it, then it must require that one have reasons for one's point of view. The exchange of *unreasoned* ideas, compared with reasoned ones,

34 That is not to say that they discover it on their own necessarily. Self-reflection may only be useful if it involves feedback from others.

35 See my 'Integrity and Self-Protection,' *Journal of Social Philosophy* 35 (2004), 221 & 222.

36 It is Calhoun's ('Standing for Something'). She refers to the evaluative communities in Mill and Kant (256). Both the unrestricted flow of ideas in Mill and the community of co-legislators in Kant require that people stand for what they believe to be true or for principles that they think should legislate everyone, respectively. In other words, they must have integrity. For otherwise the communities would not function in the way Mill and Kant intended.

is less likely to result in a serious understanding of important social issues.

If the point of having reasons to support one's point of view is twofold — that is, to avoid dogmatism and to participate in social deliberations about what is worth doing — the reasons one has need not be good reasons, nor even sophisticated reasons.³⁷ Simply having reasons will prevent one from being dogmatic. And giving bad reasons can inform social debate because it can help others to understand what reasons they should *not* have for believing that something is worthwhile.³⁸ People with integrity do not have to contribute to social debate such that they persuade others of their point of view. To require persuasion would be to set the bar too high. Integrity demands only that we adhere to our best judgment, which also might be common as opposed to novel, so that we simply add it to a consensus on what is right.

To have integrity, we do not always have to verbalize our opinions even, or our reasons for having those opinions. If someone asks us to account for our behaviour, we may have to state what our reasons are. Otherwise, we can make our view known about how people should live simply by living the way that we think people should live. If that way is familiar, others will just assume that we have the usual reasons for supporting it, without us having to explain why we do. For example, if we were environmentalists, we could just live amongst our neighbors in an environmentally friendly way, with them knowing full well our reasons for doing so. We do not have to debate environmentalism with them to take a stand on the issue.

When someone to whom we ascribe integrity does not verbalize his opinions, we still assume he has reflected upon them so that he has reasons for them. Like people with autonomy, people with integrity engage in critical self-reflection, although not necessarily well, in an objective sense. One might assume that the latter have to reflect better than the former; because of the social nature of integrity, people with integrity must reflect such that they develop reasons for why their views are coherent that would satisfy (but not necessarily persuade) others. People with autonomy only have to please themselves in that regard. Is that true? The answer is 'no' if one takes seriously the Wittgensteinian idea that people do not create normative significance

37 For example, a reason for acting courageously could simply be 'it's worth the risk'; see Rosalind Hursthouse's *On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 128.

38 See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, G. Himmelfarb, ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1982), ch. 2.

for themselves.³⁹ A claim such as ‘this new evidence does not make my beliefs incoherent’ lacks meaning unless it would or at least could satisfy others, that is, unless one could imagine them attaching the same significance to it that one does oneself. This point has to do with the social nature of selves, which influences what we can say about both autonomy and integrity.

Like people with autonomy, people with integrity also do not have to reflect extensively on what they believe. Having integrity is hard because integrity is relevant to situations of conflict or potential conflict, as I discuss below; we say that someone has integrity when that person does or would resist pressure to abandon his beliefs by whatever opposes them. And as we have seen, the resistance cannot be dogmatic. Therefore, reflection is in order, which allows for rational resistance. Reflection for any other purpose is not obviously necessary.

On the issue of self-reflection, then, autonomy and integrity are remarkably similar. Both require it and to similar degrees, with similar standards of success. *That* both require it, and the reasons *why*, point to further similarities between autonomy and integrity. For example, both involve psychological integration: that is true not only of integrity, but also of autonomy. Self-reflection produces or helps to sustain the integrated self of someone with autonomy. Such a person must be psychologically integrated, to some degree at least, for otherwise she would not have a self with which to guide her deliberations. Her choices would not be her own unless she identified with them (in an evaluative sense and) in a wholehearted way, according to Frankfurt.⁴⁰ Autonomy on his view entails wholehearted integration.⁴¹

That people with integrity, like people with autonomy, must decide upon reflection what their views are and act accordingly, rather than act

39 See Cuypers, *Self-Identity*, 143-6.

40 See his ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness.’

41 Many feminists oppose the idea that an autonomous self must be completely unified, or wholehearted in its deliberations. The reason why is that many women’s selves are made up of ‘intersectional identities’ (e.g., mother/professional; Hispanic/lesbian) that do not admit of wholehearted integration, but may be autonomous nonetheless. See Meyers, ‘Intersectional Identity,’ 168-72. Feminists writing on integrity make a similar claim about wholehearted integration and intersectional identities. See, for example, Davion’s ‘Integrity and Radical Change,’ and Margaret Walker’s ‘Picking Up Pieces: Lives, Stories, and Integrity,’ in her *Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics* (New York: Routledge 1998). Still, I do not think most feminists would deny that *some* integration is essential for both autonomy and integrity; without being somewhat integrated, one would have nothing either to govern one’s self with or to stand for.

on correct views objectively speaking, also suggests that integrity may not be any more of a virtue than autonomy. One might think that the two differ precisely in that way: one is a virtue and the other is not. But if people with corrupt views can have integrity (their views must simply be their own), why should we accept that integrity is a virtue? If it is one at all, it is probably what Calhoun calls a 'master virtue, that is, less a virtue in its own right than a pressing into service of a host of other virtues — self-knowledge, strength of will, courage, honesty, loyalty, humility, ...'⁴² In other words, integrity ensures that one will display these other virtues, which is only true, of course, if one values such things as honesty, loyalty, and humility. But might not personal autonomy also be a master virtue? Perhaps, but not to the same degree as integrity, for although personal autonomy could 'press into service' such virtues as self-knowledge and strength of will, it could not encourage all of the virtues if it involved acting on one's individual preferences, rather than one's views of what is right (e.g., be honest, be humble), which is true of integrity, if I am correct about how the two differ from one another. It follows that virtue could be a useful category in the end for distinguishing autonomy from integrity, but only if the distinction that I hope to draw is accurate.

2. *Core Values vs. All Values*

I have established that autonomy and integrity both demand that we act on what we ourselves endorse. And finding out what that is requires that we engage in critical self-reflection such that we could give reasons for valuing what we do. But perhaps having integrity involves adhering not to every value we hold, nor simply to our moral values, as I have suggested, but rather to our 'core' values, those that define who we are as persons. (Lynne McFall calls them 'identity-conferring commitments,' and Williams, 'ground projects.')

By contrast, autonomy requires that we honour all of our values. (Philosophers tend not to say that it is limited to certain sorts of values.) If that is true, our autonomy is at issue all of the time, whereas our integrity is at issue only when our identity is at stake. Consider first why one might accept that view of integrity. Williams has an answer, which presumes that the meaning of integrity lies in being psychologically integrated. Certain values of ours keep us integrated in a way that others do not because they are more central to our identities than others. If we go against those values, we experience

42 Calhoun, 'Standing for Something,' 260

psychological alienation.⁴³ Hence, identity is related to integrity because of the importance of psychological integration for integrity.

One might oppose this distinction by stating that autonomy also requires psychological integration, as we saw above, and so it is particularly important not only for integrity but also for autonomy that we are able to pursue projects that shape our identities. Otherwise, we would lack the integration needed to be autonomous. While that is true, it does not refute the claim that, unlike autonomy, integrity is *defined* in terms of adhering to our core values, and only to those values. Rooted in that claim is a view about the value of integrity: it preserves the integration of our selves. Unless autonomy is *about* that, rather than something that merely requires it, the distinction holds.

The real problem with the distinction lies elsewhere, and more specifically with the assumption that autonomy does not focus on the preservation of core values. If these values make up the self, then self-governance has to involve abiding by them. Allies to Frankfurt would agree. His theory states that people with autonomy reflect on their first-order desires using higher-order commitments, which have priority over the former, in part at least, because they represent a person's 'essential nature.' 'A person acts autonomously ... when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will,'⁴⁴ which is constituted by what the person cares about most. Proponents of the dominant view of autonomy may not connect it to core values as explicitly as philosophers do with integrity; however, the former are still committed to a connection.

Thus, autonomy involves pursuing projects that define who we are. That is the essence of personal autonomy, on my view. Does it imply that some of our values are simply irrelevant to our autonomy (i.e., those that do not contribute to our self-understanding)? So saying that autonomy involves acting on all of our values is just false? No, not necessarily. Consider someone who values being able to go to bed by 10 o'clock, but does not define herself as someone who goes to bed at 10 o'clock, nor believe that it is essential that she does. What she values highly is her own independence. She likes not having others dictate her schedule, but making up most of it herself, including when she goes to bed (whether it be 10 o'clock or midnight). Thus, whether she does go to bed by 10 o'clock (and in particular whether she goes to bed then or is pressured not to by someone else) affects whether she is being true to a higher-order

43 See Williams, 'Integrity.'

44 Frankfurt, 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,' in *Necessity, Volition*, 132

value, one that defines her in part, let us say. Since all of *our* lower-order values should link up with a higher-order value in this way, all of them should be relevant to our autonomy, at some point in time at least.

Notice that lower order values would also be relevant to our integrity, if like autonomy, it concerned the protection of higher order, core values. Thus, integrity and autonomy could not be distinct in that integrity preserves core values that shape our identities, whereas autonomy protects every value that we might have under the sun. Nonetheless, such a view is accurate insofar as it suggests that when we act with integrity, as opposed to autonomy (insofar as it differs from integrity), we pursue different kinds of commitments. The relevant kinds, on my theory, concern what we think is right and what we think is good for us, respectively.

3. *A Willingness to Resist*

Before defending that theory, I want to return specifically to McFall's view that integrity involves acting on core values. She defines 'a core' as having not simply identity-conferring commitments, but 'the kinds of commitments that give a person character and that make a loss of integrity possible.'⁴⁵ Such a loss is impossible, she claims, with someone whose only principle is to seek her own pleasure, or for someone who engages in a 'single-minded pursuit of approval' (9). The problem with either is that neither could experience difficult challenges to their views, which they could then try to resist. A willingness to resist challenge, particularly where doing so would pose significant loss or penalty, is central to having integrity. McFall writes,

A person of integrity is willing to bear the consequences of her convictions, even when this is difficult, that is, when the consequences are unpleasant. A person whose only principle is "Seek my own pleasure" is not a candidate for integrity because there is no possibility of conflict — between pleasure and principle — in which integrity could be lost. Where there is no possibility of its loss, integrity cannot exist. (9)

McFall seems to be saying that where no such possibility exists, and hence a willingness to resist is unnecessary, integrity is impossible. She would probably allow us to ascribe integrity to people whose circumstances do not actually pose threats to their integrity, and they act on what they themselves endorse nonetheless. In other words, as long as

45 McFall, 'Integrity,' 9-10

people *could* lose their integrity, but would resist the loss, they can have integrity. This makes the resistance condition counterfactual: people with integrity would resist, or are willing to resist challenge.

Returning to the approval seeker and the pleasure seeker: neither is a candidate for integrity because both would cave in to others for the sake of approval or pleasure, respectively. But is either a candidate for autonomy? Someone who continually seeks approval hardly fits our ideal of autonomy; however, what about the pleasure seeker? Surely, she could have personal autonomy at least. In fact, on my theory, she would be a perfect candidate for it, as long as she was appropriately reflective. People with personal autonomy adhere to their own conception of what is good for them, and a popular such conception is hedonistic.

If the pleasure seeker can be autonomous but could not face challenges to her own views, then presumably people with autonomy need not be willing to resist challenge, unlike people with integrity. This difference alone could explain why a person can be autonomous yet lack integrity. Perhaps we do not need to refer to what the person thinks is good for her or morally right.

However, the idea that people with autonomy need not be willing to resist is false for two reasons. First, they need to protect at least some of the higher order values that form their identities and give them selves (i.e., selves that govern) at any point in time; in other words, they need to resist forces that threaten their existing core. Otherwise, they lose the ability to govern themselves, for they have nothing to govern themselves with, which is a point I made above.

Second, saying that resisting or being willing to resist is unnecessary for autonomy flies in the face of why many of us value autonomy: that is, for its emancipatory potential. Why we value or disvalue something can tell us a lot about what it is. We value autonomy in part as a tool for resisting unwarranted paternalism, oppression, and the like, which is evident once we consider how concerns about autonomy arise. For example, only once people realized that physician values could conflict with patient values and physicians do not always know best (and hence, paternalism in medicine can harm patients) did society ascribe to physicians the duty to respect patient autonomy. Autonomy skills in patients can protect them from such harm; people with autonomy will be self-protective in the face of external pressure from others or internal temptation to embrace what others value, which is precisely why the approval seeker is not a role model for autonomy. Thus, if the value of autonomy is in part at least self-protective, a willingness to resist must be an element of autonomy.

Concerns about both autonomy and integrity surface in situations where conflict with the agent acting on her own values could occur. But if that is true, then what about the pleasure seeker as a candidate for

autonomy? If she could never experience conflict, as McFall assumes, she could not be the perfect candidate. However, McFall later withdraws that claim, admitting that challenges can exist for the pleasure seeker to which she may or may not succumb. For example, she could 'cravenly yield to the temptation to act from moral conviction, which in calm moments [she regards] as an unfortunate residue of early socialization' (10). Similarly, she could face a health care worker who abhors her hedonism and tries to convince her that health should come before many of the pleasures she seeks. (Although she may be able to feign agreement with the health care worker to avoid conflict and promote her own pleasure, and then continue on with her hedonistic ways.)

Notice that if the pleasure seeker can experience challenges, we should not have denied that she had the potential for integrity in the first place. McFall recognizes that fact, yet still refuses to acknowledge such potential in the pleasure seeker. Her explanation is this: '[resisting] temptation is not the only test of integrity; the challenge must be to something *important*,' not simply from the agent's point of view, but from the point of view of what is reasonable (10; her emphasis). Consider someone who is willing to die for the pleasure of lying on a warm beach or for sipping fine wine. We might sympathize, depending on our circumstances (e.g., we are stuck in a country that is numbingly cold and where fine wine is hard to come by); but if we knew that the person was serious, many of us would call her crazy, rather than someone with profound integrity. As McFall says, '[one] may die for beauty, truth, justice ... but not for [fine wine]' (10).

I say that someone who would die to be able to sip fine wine or simply to experience her own pleasure probably lacks integrity because her principles are barely believable as anyone's best judgment on what is right.⁴⁶ By contrast, striving to preserve truth, justice, or beauty would be believable in that regard. Like McFall, who defines what is 'important' from the perspective of the reasonable person, I presume that what is reasonable should and does influence how we ascribe integrity to others. However, the same is true with personal autonomy: we do not acknowledge it in others unless they have reflected on what is good for them such that they have reasons, which we actually take to be reasons. Only the *reflective* pleasure seeker is the perfect candidate for personal autonomy.

A willingness to resist challenge therefore does not distinguish autonomy from integrity. My responses to this last distinction along with responses to the others reveal substantial overlap between autonomy and integrity. People with autonomy and people with integrity are both

46 The judgment is more specifically that people in general, not just the agent herself, should be willing to die for fine wine.

inclined to determine what their authentic desires are and to act accordingly, particularly when the fulfillment of those desires is under threat. The psychological processes they undergo and the ways in which they act seem to be identical. One might wonder whether they *are* in fact identical (!). Why would we even think that autonomy and integrity differ from one another?

III The True Distinction

An important reason for thinking they do differ is that one can lose integrity without losing autonomy; one can betray one's own principles of right without abandoning in particular one's personal autonomy. Consider a politician who believes in equality for gays and lesbians.⁴⁷ What if she were to back down on a public stance in favor of it because of low public opinion? She would probably lose some integrity by doing that, but would not obviously sacrifice her personal autonomy. My model of distinguishing autonomy from integrity can explain why that is the case. The politician may have thought that backing down in the face of opposition furthered her good (subjectively defined; hence, she was acting autonomously⁴⁸), because it preserved her career, without believing that it was right (subjectively defined; hence, she was compromising her integrity). When our conception of what is good for us conflicts with what we think is right and we act on the former, we act with personal autonomy but forego our integrity.

By contrast, it is implausible that we could maintain our integrity yet forego our autonomy. If we were no longer self-directed — that is, could no longer reflect on what we truly valued and act accordingly — surely we could not have integrity, especially if authenticity is a requirement for it. But one might claim that on my theory, we *could* lose autonomy without losing integrity. For example, the politician above who defines her good in terms of doing what it takes to stay in office may resign herself to doing what she thinks is right (i.e., stand up for equality for

47 This example is a variation on one I use in 'Integrity and Self-Protection,' 227.

48 One might object that acting such that one furthers one's own conception of the good may not improve one's autonomy because one's good, subjectively defined, could lie in 'abnegating one's autonomy' (as one referee for this journal suggested to me). What if one's good, subjectively defined, is to be the slave of another? I think we would, or at least should, question whether such a conception of the good *is* subjectively defined. More than likely, it is the product of oppression or some other alien, negative force.

gays and lesbians). If she acts accordingly, does my theory not imply that she sacrifices autonomy for the sake of integrity? No. The theory states that integrity is a form of autonomy. So while the politician may not exercise her *personal* autonomy by going against public opinion,⁴⁹ she does not give up her autonomy in general.

But to suggest that she gives up *any* autonomy seems counter-intuitive. Unless she is coerced or momentarily deprived of her cognitive capacities, surely she decides autonomously to honour her own moral commitments. Presumably she has as much autonomy in making that decision as she does with any other. I agree. I do not deny that she could maintain her autonomy completely, but that is consistent with saying that she does not exercise her personal autonomy. The term 'autonomy' in this discussion refers to a capacity that we use, and a condition of being integrated that we achieve, when we display 'personal autonomy'; we simply use the capacity to further values that have certain contents (i.e., they define our good, subjectively speaking) when the autonomy is 'personal.' We use the same capacity and reach the same condition of being integrated when we exercise our integrity (or 'moral autonomy'); however, in that case, the content differs of the values on which we act (i.e., they define what we think is right).⁵⁰ Thus no 'autonomy' (interpreted as a capacity and a condition) is necessarily lost when we act on what we think is right or act with integrity, as opposed to acting on what we think is good for us, that is, with personal autonomy.⁵¹

49 One might ask whether aside from my theory, we have any reason to deny that she would exercise personal autonomy if she went against public opinion. After all, she might do so after having made an informed and voluntary decision. However, 'personal autonomy' does not refer simply to making informed and voluntary decisions. If it did, it would be indistinguishable from other forms of autonomy, including moral autonomy (i.e., integrity). The 'personal' in personal autonomy refers to individual goals or preferences that one thinks should motivate the self, but not others inevitably (hence the term 'personal'). 'Personal autonomy' involves satisfying personal preferences. 'Moral autonomy,' by contrast, involves adhering to one's own moral 'preferences,' if you will.

50 Assuming that what we perceive to be good for ourselves and what we perceive to be right together exhaust the sorts of values that could be the product of autonomous self-reflection, my view does not place substantive restrictions on what an agent who is *autonomous* (personally or morally) can endorse. Thus my view is faithful to its Frankfurtian starting point, which is a non-substantive, or purely procedural view of autonomy.

51 However, if we cannot simply prioritize the right over the good in our current situation, we may feel uncertain about our decision and hence not as integrated as an autonomous person perhaps should be.

Therefore, one advantage of my theory is that it fits with our intuitions about how losses of autonomy affect our integrity and vice versa. Another advantage is that it conforms to an important intuition that has yet to appear in this paper about the nature of integrity: that is, people with integrity 'stand for something.' In defending that view, Cheshire Calhoun claims that standing for something is a social act, and therefore integrity is partly a social virtue, meaning that it involves being in a proper relation to others, not simply to oneself.⁵² A person with integrity relates to others such that he puts forth his best judgment to them about how he and they should live and be treated by others. The value of doing so lies in the justification of social norms, which itself is social. Norms do not come with tags attached saying, 'good norm,' 'bad norm'; and no one has a God's eye point of view on which are good or bad. Instead, we have to deliberate upon and establish their worth together in an evaluative community (or else the norms exist arbitrarily). If none of us had integrity, this process would not occur. Integrity allows it to happen because of its unique social dimension, that is, because the content of what people with integrity stand for concerns how everyone should act.

Standing for something and making claims about what is right share the following characteristic: each expresses concern not only for ourselves and for what should motivate us given our interests, but for others and what should motivate them given their interests. In that sense, standing for something is social, although why that is true is not obvious from reading Calhoun. Hence, in the remainder of this section, I shall clarify why standing for something has this social element, and also why adhering to one's own conception of right has it. Last, I shall try to dispel potential worries about associating integrity, but not autonomy, with honouring personal principles of right.⁵³

52 'Standing for Something,' 252. One might think it is odd to say that integrity involves 'being in a proper relation to others.' Does it not sometimes require that we stand apart from society, even alienate ourselves from it, in order to remain true to what we think is right? Yes, but that is consistent with saying that we should be in the sort of relation to others that integrity demands on Calhoun's theory. The proper relation is not physical but moral. The agent must resist pressure to conform not simply for his own sake, but for others' sakes. Authentic moral concern for others should be evident from the content of his beliefs.

53 Note that there are four categories here: 1) standing for something, 2) the social nature Calhoun describes, 3) honoring one's own principles of right, and 4) having integrity. My aim is to establish connections between 1) and 2), 2) and 3), and finally, 3) and 4). Along with Calhoun, I simply assume that 1) and 4) are linked: integrity involves standing for something. I also assume that the converse could be false:

Calhoun writes, 'Standing for something is not just something [one] does for [one]self. [One] takes a stand for, and before, all deliberators who share the goal of determining what is worth doing' (257). To illustrate,⁵⁴ say that our politician in the first scenario above, who stood in favor of equality for gays and lesbians but then changed her mind, followed the tide of public opinion all along: it seemed high at first on this issue, but then it lowered significantly. 'Some of us conclude that she was only ever interested in votes, not justice. If that were our opinion, we would also wonder whether she stood *for* much of anything in the first place. She could not have stood for equality for [gays and lesbians] anyway' if she was only ever concerned for herself, or with what should motivate her given her interests (i.e., in receiving votes). ('Although she could have stood for "politicians who want votes should do whatever their constituents want."') It follows that standing for something is social in the sense that Calhoun describes.

One might object that sometimes people stand for things only for themselves, for surely someone could 'stand up for himself' before others who have treated him badly and be standing for something. His behavior would smack of integrity at least, particularly if he acts at substantial cost to himself (e.g., he loses his job or risks his life). Yet although his main concern may be for himself, the principle that guides his behavior does not apply only to him, presumably. The principle is that people should defend themselves against others who are disrespectful of them. The person who does so is a model to others of what it means to live by that principle. Thus his actions have the social dimension that Calhoun associates with standing for something.⁵⁵

It is difficult to imagine how someone could stand for something without showing concern for what should motivate others; but could

standing for something may not always involve maintaining integrity. Further, it may not always involve honouring authentic principles of right.

54 I use a very similar example in my paper, 'Integrity and Self-Protection' (forthcoming). I quote from it below.

55 It is true that in this example, the person could be standing up for what is right *primarily* for his own sake. Alternatively, people can do what is right primarily for others' sake, or for their own sake and others' sake. If my theory of integrity is accurate, people can act with integrity in each of these ways. A similar claim can be made about personal autonomy. People can do what is good for themselves, for people close to them, or for themselves and those people, and act with personal autonomy, though not necessarily with integrity, in each case. When a person promotes someone else's good or his own good while violating his own principles of right, he acts autonomously but without integrity.

someone not adhere to his own view on what is right without displaying such concern? Do we not sometimes justify our behavior to others by saying 'it was the right thing to do,' without assuming it would be right for them to do or for anyone else to do? The man who stands up for himself might think that way. A myriad of factors about his own situation could determine his assessment of what he should do, and as a result, he does not generalize that assessment over other people's behavior. Still, he would have to accept that anyone in a situation relevantly similar to his should do the same thing that he has done, would he not (and identifying what is relevant would require some generalization)? Otherwise, he would fail to adopt a view on what is right that is recognizable to most people. The dominant conception of right is that it extends beyond the individual.

One might question how far it does extend, however. To have an actual view on what is right, do we need to assume that *anyone* in relevantly similar situations to ours should do what we think is right? In other words, do we have to accept that 'ethics takes a universal point of view'?⁵⁶ Many philosophers would say 'yes,' most notably Kantians and utilitarians. Others would say 'no,' in particular some contemporary virtue theorists.⁵⁷ The latter agree nonetheless that the domain of right extends beyond the individual; they simply disagree that we can establish its content from a universal or neutral point of view. Roughly, these philosophers take a 'Neurathian procedure in ethics,'⁵⁸ arguing that we cannot justify a moral framework by abandoning our own and adopting a 'view from nowhere.'⁵⁹ We are stuck on the moral boat we were put on at birth, although we can change it 'bit by bit, plank by plank.'⁶⁰ When it gets leaky — that is, recognizably deficient as a guide to how to live and interact with others — we can fix it. And in doing so, we make it more objective than it would otherwise be. But we never give it an independent foundation, which would allow us to say that anyone — whether they are on our boat or whether we have ever encountered them

56 Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press 1993)

57 See Rosalind Hursthouse's *On Virtue Ethics*, and John McDowell's 'Virtue and Reason,' *Monist* 62 (1979) 331-50, as well as his 'Two Sorts of Naturalism,' in *Virtues and Reasons*, Hursthouse, G. Lawrence, and W. Quinn, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995).

58 Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 165

59 Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (New York: Oxford University Press 1986)

60 W.V.O. Quine, 'Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis,' in *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper & Row 1963), 78; quoted in Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics*, 165

(and subsequently, renovated our boat to accommodate them, if necessary) — should behave as we do.

Whether one endorses universalism or the Neurathian alternative, one has to accept that the domain of right concerns not only how an individual agent should behave, but also how others around him should behave. On the Neurathian approach, stating, 'X is right' means that it is right not just for one's self but also for everyone in one's boat (or for everyone that one's boat can accommodate). One assumes that such a claim is true when one makes pronouncements on what is right, although of course one may be wrong in one's assumptions.

Thus saying that something is right and standing for something both involve taking a stance on what should motivate others, not simply the self. It follows that the categories of standing for something and doing what is right, subjectively speaking, overlap. If integrity concerns the latter, my theory of integrity and the intuition that it entails standing for something cohere with one another. Now let me explore whether integrity in fact involves doing what is right, subjectively speaking.

While Calhoun says that the social value of integrity lies in the justification of social norms, my view is that the sort of norms people aim to establish when acting with integrity are moral norms about what is right. These are basic norms governing a society that allow people in it to coexist with one another. They are not trivial norms, such as those of mere etiquette. Surely, our integrity does not concern them. Imagine someone standing for a matter of pure etiquette, such as eating with the proper fork or refusing to wear white shoes after Labor Day. Whether someone can take a stand on such matters — whether we would call what they do 'taking a stand' as opposed to mere posturing — is questionable. Whether someone acts with *integrity* in demanding that people use the proper fork is less questionable. McFall is right that ascriptions of integrity imply that one is engaged in matters of some importance.⁶¹

But, of course, one can make judgments that are not so trivial as what utensils people should use and yet which still do not concern what is right. What about claiming that a piece of art is rubbish or recommending 'one, [but] not the only, worthwhile way of conducting a good life'?⁶² With the former, one is not saying that it is *morally wrong* that the art exists, or with the latter, that the way to live that one endorses is *the* right

61 Note that for me, this restriction about importance is ultimately procedural. I have said that when someone's principles of right concern trivial matters, they are 'barely believable as anyone's best judgment' about what is right (16). The implication here is that the person has not adequately reflected on what is right.

62 Calhoun, 257

way to live. Could a person not display integrity in making such judgments? Consider again that whether integrity is at issue depends on whether a potential for conflict exists. So we would ascribe integrity to the person who thinks the art is trash if she could be under some pressure to think otherwise or to withhold her opinion. By expressing a willingness to resist, what she stands for is that she deserves to have an opinion on the art and to have that opinion heard. Instead, or in addition, she might believe that it is *right* for everyone to be able to appreciate good art, not trash. If she were not making either of these statements, what would she be standing for? It is hard to fathom what that could be. Similarly, with the person who claims that a certain way of life is worthwhile: he may be trying to maintain some self-respect or, if he were standing for that way of life before others in a way that would promote his integrity, he must believe that it provides some goods (e.g., pleasure, honor, respect) that others should have. In other words, it is worth recommending not because it is *the* right way to live necessarily, but because it is consistent with doing what he thinks is right. If he were proposing instead that it is a good life, but not because there is anything right about it, would we say that he had integrity? Imagine someone who does not believe that doing what is right involves pursuing bodily pleasure, yet he publicly endorses his life of spa visits, playing golf, and dating younger women. Does he have integrity? Would we say that he did? I doubt it.

Thus, having integrity involves standing specifically for what one thinks is right, and as such it involves having concern for what should motivate others, not only the self. One might think that to call such behavior integrity and something else (personal) autonomy is wrong because autonomy is about acting on principles that should motivate everyone (or at least everyone who is similarly situated). Needless to say, that was how Kant interpreted autonomy (!), and he emphasized it in his moral theory more than any philosopher before him. For Kant, autonomy implied the self-imposition of laws of reason that should motivate any being with a rational will. It involved looking beyond merely contingent aspects of the self to find sources of obligation that would bind everyone equally. Those sources lie within the self, though not in aspects of it which make it distinct from other selves.

Kant focused on what contemporary philosophers call 'moral autonomy',⁶³ however, which I call integrity. While modern notions of per-

63 But most contemporary philosophers assume, unlike Kant, that one can be morally autonomous even if one's moral views are objectively wrong. I think that the same is true about integrity.

sonal autonomy by contrast may have their roots in Kant, they diverge dramatically from Kantian autonomy.⁶⁴ They might originate specifically in Kant's notion of 'negative freedom,' which is 'the property [the will] has of being able to work independently of alien causes.'⁶⁵ However, they depart significantly from his view of positive freedom, which is the property of a will being 'a law to itself ... independently of every property belonging to the objects of volition.'⁶⁶ Roughly, the will is free in a positive sense when principles of reason latent in or constitutive of the capacity of practical agency itself determine the will, rather than individual desires or other contingent ends. By contrast, modern autonomy involves being governed in part by individual desires as long as they are authentic desires. Distinct features of one's individual make-up are relevant to our autonomy in a modern sense.

What would explain the shift away from Kantian autonomy (and not only Kantian autonomy, for philosophers before Kant had views of autonomy as self-legislation from a purely rational and impartial perspective — e.g., Rousseau)? For Kant and others, being governed by individual desires was the antithesis of freedom. I can make sense of this shift with my theory by emphasizing how in the past, it was uncommon to interpret the good in terms of the satisfaction of individual preferences. The good was more substantive and objective than that, particularly in ancient and medieval philosophy.⁶⁷ The view that what is good for one individual may not be good for another because their preferences may differ is a modern liberal notion.⁶⁸ Once it took hold, we needed a sense of autonomy distinct from moral autonomy that involved the

64 See Christman's introduction to *The Inner Citadel*, 14-15.

65 See Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, H.J. Paton, trans. (New York: Harper and Row 1964), 114; quoted in Thomas Hill's 'The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,' in Christman, *The Inner Citadel*, 97.

66 Kant, *Groundwork*, 108; quoted in Hill, 'The Kantian Conception,' 98

67 For the ancients as well as for medieval Christian philosophers, the good life was one of virtue. Today, we are seeing a resurgence of such theories of the good (i.e., objectivist theories) in ethics with the current revival of virtue ethics. See, for example, Hursthouse's *Virtues and Reasons* volume, and a similar volume, *Virtue Ethics*, Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997).

68 Note that it is not a Kantian notion: while happiness may be defined subjectively, in terms of individual preferences in Kant, the good is not. For Kant, '[it] is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a *good will*' (his emphasis, *Groundwork*, 61).

pursuit of an individual's own conception of her good defined in terms of her individual desires.

Thus to have personal autonomy is to act on desires that aim at furthering our subjective view of the good. Moral autonomy — that is standing by our own conception of what is right — is indistinguishable from integrity. I have shown that insofar as they are distinct from one another, autonomy and integrity differ not in terms of the moral psychology each demands or the sort of action each requires (i.e., act on what we ourselves believe), but only in terms of the kinds of commitments that should govern our actions.

The implications of this view are important for understanding the value of personal autonomy and integrity. By defining personal autonomy as living up to a conception of the good that is self-defined and self-defining, I capture the sense in which autonomy allows for emancipation from oppressively uniform and restrictive social environments.⁶⁹ If integrity is a variation on autonomy, but in the moral realm, it is also a matter of emancipation (among other things, such as contributing to the justification of moral norms). People are not free if they cannot think for themselves in that realm. Promoting freedom within it involves developing and nurturing people's integrity.

This paper also has implications for moral education. It stands to reason, in light of my view, that insofar as autonomy is distinct from integrity, it is necessary for it. If personal autonomy involves forming and sustaining an identity — being a 'somebody,' if you will — one needs it in order to develop one's own view on what is right. (How can one have such a view without being someone in the first place, as opposed to merely being a member of a group or someone else's friend, sister, son, or the like?) For example, Ken Wiwa, son of the Nigerian martyr Ken Saro Wiwa, had to go through a process of self-discovery — in his case, of figuring out who he was beyond being his father's son — before deciding for himself what morality required of him in terms of how he ought to contribute to the cause of his people, the Ogonis.⁷⁰ Wiwa's story and others like it would be helpful in defending the idea that personal autonomy is a prerequisite for integrity, as I have described the two. If

69 One might argue that the opposite is true with respect to autonomy and emancipation: some emancipation, in the form of freedom from restrictions or from external coercion, is necessary before one can exercise of autonomy. I agree. However, freedom of that form is not complete emancipation; one might still lack the capacity to form and act upon one's own desires. Hence, autonomy, or the development of it, allows for complete emancipation.

70 See Ken Wiwa, *In the Shadow of a Saint* (Toronto: Random House 2000).

that idea is correct, it confirms an intuition, which many of us probably share, that a moral education in integrity should include an education in personal autonomy.

Before ending this discussion, let us return to our quiz and ask what the right answers are, given what I have argued about integrity and autonomy. The answers do differ from what the authors of the quotations wrote. Not to leave you in suspense, but they are the same for every question(!): either autonomy or integrity. Both are about being true to our selves, which covers 1) and 2). Question 3) interprets 'a distinctive sense of one's own character' as 'a sense of what is important' to us, which is relevant to both our personal autonomy and our integrity (assuming that what is important to us extends to what we think is good *and* right). Lastly, question 4): both autonomy and integrity require that we act on our own reasons, as opposed to good reasons necessarily. Both demand that we have reasons, but not that we are objective in defining what is good and what is right. One might assume that the similarity in these answers undermines the idea that a true distinction exists; however, I think it simply underscores the need for philosophers to be clearer about what they mean by autonomy and integrity.

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